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Fox: Softening the Short Shrift: Regulating Homeowners Insurance Limit

COMMENTS
SOFTENING THE SHORT SHRIFT: REGULATING HOMEOWNERS
INSURANCE LIMITS AS CAUSES OF UNDERINSURANCE

When Agnes Everett's home was destroyed by a wildfire, State
Farm Insurance, her homeowners insurance provider, agreed that she
had suffered a "total loss."' When Everett discovered that she had
paid premiums for twelve years for "replacement coverage" that left
her over $350,000 underinsured, she brought multiple claims against
State Farm-each effectively asserting that State Farm failed to
perform as promised.2 Everett alleged that when she began her
relationship with State Farm, her agent assured her that her policy was
sufficient to cover any loss, and that she had "nothing to worry
about." 3 State Farm responded by stating that six years after its initial
assurances, it changed the terms of the policy by instituting limits on
the amount it would pay and gave "clearly worded notice" of the
change.4 State Farm had also sent yearly reminders to Everett that the
limits on her policy might be "significantly different" than the actual
replacement cost of her home, and that it was Everett's responsibility
to ensure that her coverage was adequate. 5 The California Court of
Appeal, in affirming summary judgment in favor of State Farm, held
that while Everett claimed that State Farm's own assurances obligated
1. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162
Cal. App. 4th 649 (2008) (No. E041807).
2. Id.at 2, 17.
3. Id.at 4.
4. Respondent's Brief at 1, Everett, 162 Cal. App. 4th 649 (No. E041807). For
several years preceding the fire, the annual Renewal Certificate for Everett's policy
included a statement that her policy limits reflected an "estimated replacement cost"
and that "the actual cost to replace your home may be significantly different." Id. at
7. The Certificate also warned that "State Farm does not guarantee that this figure
will represent the actual cost to replace your home" and that Everett, the insured,
was "responsible for selecting the appropriate amount of coverage .... Id.
5. Id. at 7.
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Everett herself bore that burden under
it to keep her "in good hands,"
6
contract.
her
the terms of
Everett's indignation toward State Farm's seemingly sudden and
convenient abnegation of responsibility is shared by some
commentators. 7 The messages conveyed by insurers, both via
advertising and in-person assurances by insurance agents, are
sometimes perceived as creating a duty to fulfill the resultant
"reasonable expectations" of consumers. 8 The purpose of this
Comment is to explore the legal implications of one possible
expectation of consumers-that insurer assessments of "proper"
insurance limits actually serve as competent appraisals of property
values. State Farm's written admonishment to Agnes Everett that she
was responsible to accurately diagnose her own needs may strike
many as contrary to insurers' advertised self-portrayals as competent
guardians of consumer interests. 9 While litigation and research
concerning the legal obligations of insurers often focus upon those
duties created by the formation of a contract between insurer and
insured, insurance limits relate primarily to matters of fact (i.e., the
replacement value of a home), the accuracy of which are independent
6. Everett, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 661.
7. See Eugene R. Anderson & James J. Fournier, Why Courts Enforce
Insurance Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations of Insurance
Coverage, 5 CONN.INS. L. J.335, 380-81 (1998) (asserting that insurers owe a duty
to fulfill policyholders' expectation of protection and that "opportunistic breach" is
inconsistent with that duty).
8. Id. at 394.
9. See id. at 393-94. See also Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance
Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72
TEx. L. REV. 1395, 1403-05 (1994) (detailing insurer advertisements which
promulgate a "story of trust and dependence"). Courts have also recognized the
effect of insurer advertising upon consumer perceptions of the duties that insurers
undertake. Some have held that such assurances may be considered in determining
whether an insurer has committed itself to accepting broad fiduciary duties. See,
e.g., Force v. ITT Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 843, 854 n. 11 (D.
Minn. 1998); Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 506, 545-47
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). However, in the context of fraud litigation, at least one court has
described Allstate's "you're in good hands" slogan as an example of "loose general
statements made by sellers in commending their wares . . . upon which no
reasonable man would rely." Smith v. Allstate Ins. Co., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154
(S.D. Cal. 2001) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON, TORTS §
109, at 756-57 (5th ed. 1984)).
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of any contractual obligation on the part of the insurer.
However, where insurance limits are substantially lower than the
replacement cost of a home, the processes which were used in setting
those limits may come into question. After the 2003 Southern
California wildfires, many homeowners found that while their
insurance contracts indicated that coverage extended to the
replacement cost of their homes, the numerical limits on payment
10
were drastically lower than the cost of rebuilding the homes.
Homeowner Pam Mitchell, whose dwelling replacement limit on her
State Farm policy was $358,195, also had an "extended coverage"
provision which increased the limit to $429,834.11 However, the cost
of replacing her home was $782,000.12
The phenomenon of
underinsurance among the victims of the Southern California wildfires
brought attention to the software used by insurance agents to assess
the appropriate coverage limits for individual homeowners.1 3 The
software, designed and manufactured by Marshall & Swift/Boeckh
LLC, employed a "Quick Quote" option for assessing residential
property value based upon the property's zip code, square footage,
year of construction, and a few other factors. 14 The reliability of this
assessment procedure was questioned, and consumer advocates
maintained that the "Quick Quote" option resulted in assessments of
replacement cost which were forty percent lower than more detailed
15
assessment options offered to insurance agents in the same software.

The position of a consumer who procures homeowners insurance
from an insurance agent differs from that of other consumers in that
the insurance buyer may, like the wildfire victims discussed above, be
ignorant of what he or she needs in the first place. One recent study
revealed that nearly fifty percent of surveyed homeowners incorrectly
believed that their insurer or agent bore the responsibility of
6
accurately determining the replacement costs of their dwelling.'
10. Elliot Spagat, Insurance Calculator Questioned: Homeowners Discover
Coverage was Insufficient, WASHINGTON POST, July 24, 2004, at G3.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13.

14.
15.
16.
Oct. 30,

Id.

Id.
Id.
J.D. Power: Homeowners Want Carriers to Offer Identity Theft, INS. J.,
2006, availableat http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2006/
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Insofar as the consumer relies upon insurer quotes as representative of
what the buyer needs, the interaction between insurer and the
prospective insured would seem to be inconsistent with the sort of
arms-length bargaining process usually associated with contract
formation.
The legal framework currently applied to purchases of
homeowners insurance is inadequate to protect homeowners such as
Everett and Mitchell. Both consumer tendencies and the bargaining
power and incentives of insurers warrant legal regulation of the "limits
assessment" process.
Part I of this Comment considers the
circumstances surrounding the agreement to purchase homeowners
insurance that warrant regulation of the process. Part II.A explores
the language of both courts and commentators seeking to justify the
legal imposition of a "quasi-fiduciary" duty on insurers based upon
the nature of the relationship between insurance agents and
consumers. Part II.B addresses the awkwardness of applying such
"quasi-fiduciary" obligations, as articulated by those courts and
commentators, to the context of initial insurance limits assessments.
Part III.A provides a brief overview of the "reasonable
expectations" doctrine and the shortcomings of that doctrine as a
means of judicial regulation of insurance contracts, as articulated by
recent critics of the doctrine. Part III.B notes the potential remedial
effects of a product liability framework to the problem of inadequate
value assessment by insurers.
Part IV.A examines the possible role of enterprise liability as a
means of achieving the ideal distribution of risk that homeowners
insurance would effect if consumers were "perfectly rational" actors.
Part IV.B suggests possible regulatory remedies of the practices
related to under-assessment, including a blanket prohibition of policy
limits in homeowners insurance policies. Such a prohibition could
eliminate the acute losses experienced by consumers like Everett,
without destroying insurer solvency.

10/30/73688 (discussing J.D. Power & Associates' 2006 Homeowners Insurance
Study). Given the widespread erroneous belief that insurers are obligated to
"diagnose" an accurate replacement cost, reports that approximately two-thirds of
homes in the United States are underinsured seem unsurprising. See, e.g., Joseph B.
Treaster, Homeowners Come Up Short on Insurance,N.Y. TIMES, August 31, 2004,
at Al (citing a nationwide estimate by Marshall & Swift/Boeckh, LLC).
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I. JUSTIFYING REGULATION
When a consumer seeks either to procure services or to purchase a
product via contract, she usually has a fairly good idea of what she
wants. The primary reason for acquiring additional information is
simply to determine which means will meet the desired end. The
consumer, as one who desires the sought-after end, has an incentive to
effectively acquire it. When presented with offers of goods or
services, she may discriminate between offers based upon their
perceived conformity to her desires and their relative expense. She
engages prospective sellers in the process of negotiating a bargainedfor exchange. Under traditional contract law, in this context, "No
person is another's keeper ....Each contracting party is free to obtain

the best possible deal at the other's expense." 17
One of the primary forces moving consumers to buy homeowners
insurance is the fact that it is required by mortgage lenders. 18 As such,
these consumers may not be "drawn" to the market for insurance
because of their desire to be protected from risk, but rather as a
procedural prerequisite to the desired end product-a home. As
consumer interest in protection decreases in salience, the motivation to
acquire information regarding the effectiveness of a particular policy
Accordingly, purchasers of
offered also decreases naturally.
homeowners insurance are often fairly characterized as "uninvolved
consumers" who forego the sort of rational deliberation described
above. 19
Purchasers of homeowners insurance are also susceptible to what

17. 2 ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES'S APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE 398 (2d ed. 1996).
18. Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 314 (1998). Thomas notes that

consumer reliance upon information provided by lenders is typical of the "lowinvolvement consumer." Id.
19. See id. at 307. Prospective insureds also rely heavily on word-of-mouth,
insurer literature and advertisements, and the assurances of insurance agents
themselves. Id. at 311-12. At the same time, they seldom "consult sources of
neutral and comprehensive information, such as those from consumer organizations
and state regulators." Id. at 313. Insurance consumers' behavior thus bears little
resemblance to what Thomas deems "cognitive" consumer behavior, the sort of
behavior presumed by the law of contracts. See id. at 306-07.
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commentators describe as "optimism bias." 20 This term reflects the
tendency of consumers to irrationally believe that a low-probability
event simply will not happen to them. 2 ' The natural effect of this
belief is a decrease in concern over whether the insurance limits stated
in one's policy accurately reflect the replacement cost of one's home.
Combined with the tendency of homeowners insurance purchasers to
be relatively uninvolved in seeking and deciding upon a policy, this
optimism-rooted lack of concern certainly contradicts the traditional
paradigm of a "contract"-wherein, as mentioned above, parties with
articulable interests wrangle with each other to reach an agreement
that conforms to those interests. This sort of consumer behavior may
be said to exhibit "bounded rationality" as opposed to "full
rationality." Specifically, prospective purchasers of homeowners
insurance may only consider those attributes of the insurance contract
that relate to their interests (satisfying lender requirements), while
ignoring others (adequacy of "assessed" limits). 22 This boundedness
can lead not only to agreement upon unfavorable contract terms, but
can also result in a lack of awareness of what the purchaser needs at
the outset.
Insurance consumers' decision-making processes may also be
affected by factors that behavioral researchers label the "availability
heuristic" ' 23 and "experiential thinking." 24 The availability heuristic
reflects individuals' tendencies to use those concepts and criteria that
are "available" (or cognitively accessible) to them at the time the

20. See generally Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 655-66

(1999); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sustein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199, 204 (2006).
21. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 20, at 656. Hanson and Kysar cite as an
illustration of optimism bias one study in which "respondents... although correctly
estimating that fifty percent of American couples end up in divorce, estimated their
own chance of divorce at zero." Id. at 655.
22. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts,
and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1206 (1998) (noting that "market

competition actually will force sellers to provide low-quality non-salient attributes in
order to save costs that will be passed along to buyers in the form of lower prices.").
23. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 20, at 662. "Heuristic" here simply refers to a
"mental rule of thumb." Id.
24. See id. at 669.
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decision-making process occurs. 25 The number of decisional axes that
are available will necessarily be limited, and consumers use far fewer
criteria than the paradigmatic "rational actor" presumed by contract
law-an actor who bears a striking resemblance to the "expected
utility maximizer of the economist's model. 26 One likely reason why
the availability heuristic is a factor in policy purchasers' behavior is
the simple fact that few have experienced the low-probability losses
for which they seek insurance. All individuals tend to act in an
intuitive manner, based upon previous encounters with external
stimuli. 27 The overwhelming majority of consumers have experienced
neither a total loss nor the types of resultant battles with insurers that
Everett endured.28 One relevant question, explored in Section IllI.B, is
whether informing insurers of the experiences of others can be
expected to alter the behavioral effects of both the optimism bias and
experiential thinking on the part of consumers.
The bargaining power of individual purchasers relative to their
prospective insurers is also exceedingly low. 29 Consumers seek (or
are required) to protect themselves from disaster. Their means of
25. See id. at 662.
26. See id. at 669. Hanson and Kysar note that one instantiation of the
availability heuristic is that "dramatic stories by people we know about difficulties
with a brand of car are likely to be overly influential even if we are familiar, via
Consumer Reports, with general statistics of the reliability of different brands." Id.
at 663 (quoting Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 30
(1998)). This phenomenon of reliance upon familiar sources of information, without
inquiry into their comprehensiveness or reliability for the purpose of ascertaining
one's own vulnerability, is consistent with Thomas's description of insurance
consumers as reliant upon word-of-mouth and neglectful of "neutral" sources, such
as consumer studies. See Thomas, supra note 18, at 311-13.
27. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 20, at 669.
28. Even a major disaster such as the 2003 Southern California wildfires,
which covered seven hundred and fifty thousand acres, destroyed only four thousand
residential properties-a small fraction of the homeowner population. See Howard
C. Kunreuther & Erwann 0. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change, Insurability of LargeScale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1795,
1825 (2007).
29. See generally Anderson & Fournier, supra note 7, at 396-98. Here, to say
that there is a "disparity in bargaining power" simply means that "one side [the
prospective insured] has no meaningful opportunity to influence the terms of the
agreement." Paul F. Kirgis, The Contractarian Model of Arbitration and its
Implicationfor JudicialReview of ArbitralAwards, 85 OR. L. REv. 1, 50 (2006).
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investigating options and taking relevant information into proper
account is often generally short-sighted. Because consumers are
relatively unlikely to "shop around" for the better deal,3 the insurer
has less incentive to offer a policy containing substantively attractive
features to better the competition. The very existence of meaningful
competition between insurers is called into question by the fact that
insurance contracts, and the obligations that they entail, tend to
contain the same provisions as they are based upon standardized
forms.

31

In the context of assessing proper limits for an insured's home,
standardization tends to come in a slightly different form-that of
software used by insurers to ascertain limits. The software used in the
undervaluation of Pam Mitchell's home was produced by Marshall &
Swift/Boeckh, LLC (MSB).32 In Marshall & Swift's own words, "As
the leading provider of property intelligence, MSB serves nearly every
top 100 property insurer in North America." 33 A competitor described
the company as having "a monopoly" on property valuation
instruments. 34 A consumer intent on finding the company with the
best and most accurate means of determining the replacement cost of
her property would thus likely be faced with a lack of meaningfully
different options.
With limited competition for the business of relatively
uninvolved, often arational consumers, insurers have both the
incentive and the ability to set low policy limits. The function of
lower limits is, simply put, to reduce the potential cost to the insurer
and increase the probability that the insured will be forced to bear the
sort of losses suffered by Mitchell and Everett. Where an insurer is
not limited by rationally vigilant consumer behavior, it may use to its
advantage the fact that "[t]he unresponsive consumers will accept the
30. Thomas, supra note 18, at 308.
31. See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1389, 1405-06 (2007)
(noting that the standardized contracts used by insurers, "virtually all" of which are
drafted by the Insurance Services Organization, do not change according to the
pressures of competition, but instead resemble "differentiated products offered by a
single monopolist").
32. Spagat, supra note 10, at G3.
33. MSB, http://www.msbinfo.com/Company (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
34. Spagat, supra note 10, at G3.
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exploitive contract without demanding a corresponding decrease in
price .... 35
The consumer inclination to forego "shopping" for insurers, in
conjunction with the standardized contracts and methods of property
valuation used by insurers, indicates that a bargaining process between
insurer and insured is unlikely to take place, and if it does, is unlikely
to be effective. For most homeowners, the purchase of insurance
seems mischaracterized as a "bargained-for exchange."
II.A The Insureras "Quasi-Fiduciary"

Both courts and commentators do, from time to time, make
reference to the relationship between insurer and insured as a
"fiduciary" or "quasi-fiduciary" relationship. 36 The term "fiduciary"
generally designates a person "required to act for the benefit of
another on all matters within the scope of their relationship; one who
owes to another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence and
candor." 37 The appeal of harnessing the "fiduciary" label and its
attendant obligations upon the insurer is attributable to the fact that
consumers tend to trust that insurers will protect them from the effects
35. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1408. Schwarcz, focusing upon the terms
and provisions included in the contract, concludes that "if cognitive limitations...
are widespread, insurers may be able to determine by research and experience which
coverage exclusions insureds will ignore or overlook, and then use this information
to selectively draft inefficiently one-sided terms." Id. at 1422.
36. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gov't Employment Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 3d 441,
446 (1984) (describing the relationship between an automobile insurer and its
insured as a fiduciary relationship); RAFAEL CHODOS, THE LAW OF FIDuCIARY
DuTtEs, 65-66 (2000) (detailing the tendency of the California courts to describe the
legal responsibilities of insurers in the language of fiduciary duty); Anderson &
Fournier, supra note 7, at 385-91 (cataloguing insurer acknowledgments of "the
fiduciary duties owed to their policyholders."); Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken
v. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993
U. ILL. L. REv. 897, 915-16, 929 (1993) (arguing for the recognition of criteria for a
more expansive definition of fiduciary relationships). But cf., e.g., Metro
Renovation, Inc. v. Allied Group, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1135 (D. Neb. 2005)
(holding that Nebraska law does not recognize a generally applicable fiduciary duty
owed by the insurer to the insured); Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers are
Not Fiduciaries to Their Insureds, 88 KY. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1999-2000) (purporting to
"demonstrate that insurers are not fiduciaries to their insureds in ordinary
circumstances or situations").
37. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009).
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of disaster, and insurers cultivate and encourage such trust through
38
advertising and other communications to prospective consumers.
Another justification of the imposition of a fiduciary duty is that in
some situations the difference in the positions of the parties is such
"that had the parties in advance negotiated expressly over the issue
they would have agreed that the agent owed the principal the high
duty that we have described, because otherwise the principal would be
39
placing himself at the agent's mercy."
In the context of limits assessments, the existence of a fiduciary
duty-a duty of the insurer to act for the benefit of the insuredwould signify the obligation to do everything practicable to ensure
that policy limits accurately reflect the cost of replacement in the
event of a total loss. It would be a duty to accurately diagnose the
insured's needs. In Everett's case, as in the case of nearly every
insured, the question of a "duty to diagnose" need accurately was, in
the court's view, not in question. 40 The terms of Everett's policy
explicitly stated that State Farm was not responsible for diagnosing
Everett's need.41 On its face, under standard contract law, the terms
of the policy indicate that Everett and State farm did negotiate
expressly and reach an agreement concerning the duty to diagnose.
In describing the duty of the insured, the California Supreme
Court has stated that "[w]ith the public trust must go private
responsibility consonant with the trust, including qualities of decency
and humanity inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary., 42 When
38. See Anderson & Fournier, supra note 7, at 394; Scallen, supra note 36, at
933. See also cases cited supra note 9.
39. Scott FitzGibbon, FiduciaryRelationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ.
L. REv. 303, 322 (1999) (quoting Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir.
1992)). FitzGibbon notes that a contracting party's vulnerability, where extreme,
may serve as a factor contributing to a finding of unconscionability. Id. at 323-24.
However, even where bargaining power is imbalanced in the extreme, invalidation
of a contract on the grounds of unconscionability also requires that "the terms of the
contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld." Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965). But see Korobkin,
supra note 22, at 1206 (promoting a view that defines "unconscionability" in terms
of "social inefficiency" rather than terms of "unfairness").
40. Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th 649, 660 (2008).
41. Id.
42. Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. 3d 208, 215 (1986); see also
CHODOS, supra note 35, at 65. The Frommoethelydo court specifically designated

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol46/iss2/5

10

Fox: Softening the Short Shrift: Regulating Homeowners Insurance Limit

2010]

REGULATING HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE LIMITS

379

such language is employed to impose a duty upon an insurer, several
43
factors justifying regulation discussed in Part I are cited in support.
Intuitively, it seems fitting to say that companies that benefit by
representing themselves to uninformed, vulnerable consumers as
being committed to "taking care of' those consumers have also bound
themselves to a heightened duty to their policyholders.
Under one proposed standard for determining the existence of a
fiduciary duty:
"[A] fiduciary relationship exists when there is (1) dependence or
vulnerability by one party on the other, that (2) results in power
being conferred on the other (3) such that the entrusting party is not
able to protect itself effectively, by "cover" or otherwise, and (4)
this entrustment has been solicited or accepted by the party on
which the fiduciary obligation is imposed."44

Given the limited bargaining power and lack of either information
or meaningful choice on behalf of the prospective insured discussed in
Part I, the first of these criteria is easily met. Vulnerability exists the
moment the consumer walks into an agent's office or visits the
insurer's website. The relevant issue under these criteria, however,
then becomes the point at which a consumer "confers power" upon the
insurer.
The natural response to this question is that power is conferred
when the contract is signed.
II.B. "Quasi-Fiduciary"Norms as ContractualObligations
The context in which the language of fiduciary responsibility is
applied to insurers strongly indicates that any such purported duty
arises from the promises made in the contract between insurer and
insured. Limits assessments, construed as extra-contractual
this "private responsibility" as supplemental to an insurer's contractual duty of good
faith and fair dealing. See Frommoethelydo, 42 Cal. 3d at 215.

43. Richmond contends that "courts that have cast insurers as fiduciaries have
done so to fill the void created by the parties' disparate bargaining power and
insurers' exclusive control over litigation, settlement, and claim processing."
Richmond, supra note 36, at 5. See also Anderson & Fournier, supra note 7, at 336.
44. Scallen, supra note 36, at 922.
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"diagnoses" or approximations of consumer need, take place outside
the scope of obligations created by the contract and thus do not fit
within the "quasi-fiduciary" obligations often imputed to the insured.
The California Court of Appeal's explanation of an insurer's duty
to the insured in State Farm Fire Casualty Co. v. Superior Court45 is
illustrative. The court stated that "It]he relationship between an
insurer and an insured is akin to a fiduciary relationship. 46 The
"kinship" noted by the court lies in the fact that "It]he insurer is bound
to conduct itself with the utmost good faith for the benefit of its
insured. 47 The court, however, did explain that the insurer's duty to
act in the interests of the insured is not unlimited, but arises from
contractual promises and statutory provisions which simply reinforce
the contractual duty of good faith.48
The concept of a fiduciary duty, even when imputed via the liberal
criteria set out by Scallen above, only applies to instances in which the
would-be fiduciary has expressed "some indication of acceptance,
whether express or implied, of that higher duty." 49 Indeed, the
sentiment that insurers should be bound by something akin to a
fiduciary duty is grounded in the fact that insurers seem to promise to
do so. However, the obligations arising from a contractual promise
are limited to the terms of the agreement. The contractual duty of
"good faith" encompasses only those promises. Richard Posner has
postulated that:

45. State Farm Fire & Casualty, Co. v. Superior Court, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1222
(1989).
46. Id. at 1226.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 374-75; see also Cal. Ins. Code §332 (2005) ("Each party to a
contract of insurance shall communicate to the other, in good faith, all facts within
his knowledge which are or which he believes to be material to the contract and as to
which he makes no warranty, and which the other has not the means of
ascertaining."). In Everett's case, State Farm met this standard simply by notifying
Everett of her responsibilities to ascertain her own need. See Everett, supra note 4
and accompanying text.
49. Scallen, supra note 36, at 971. See also Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary
Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 135 (2008) ("[Fliduciary

relationships, like other agency relationships, entail consent by the principal that the
fiduciary will act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control.").
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The particular confusion to which the vaguely moralistic overtones
of 'good faith' give rise is the belief that every contract establishes
a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary is required to treat his
principal as if the principal were he... . In fact the law
contemplates that people frequently will take advantage of the
50
ignorance of those with whom they contract ....

The concept of an insurer's "fiduciary duty" has been effectively
limited in application to describe the contractual obligations of the
insurer. 51 The function of the term has been largely to regulate the
duty to execute existing obligations, rather than create new ones.52 As
in Everett's case, insurer assessment of policy limits occurs "outside"
of the scope of the contract and is accompanied by contractual terms
expressly relieving insurers of the responsibility to accurately
diagnose the need of the insured.53
"Fiduciary duty" is thus ill-suited as a vehicle for the regulation of
limits assessments by insurers. Its precedential force extends only so
far as the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which arises under
the terms of any contract.
However, the intuition remains that consumers rely upon the selfreported role of the insurer as one who will serve to protect them
when calamity arrives, and that insurers benefit from this selfportrayal.
III.A. Reasonable Expectations and the Insurer's ContractualDuty
Another means of imposing duty upon the insurer is more
explicitly rooted in the contract, rather than solely in the "special
qualities" of the relationship between insurer and insured. The
doctrine of reasonable expectations has been used by courts to enforce
the objectively reasonable expectations of insureds "even though
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated those
50. FitzGibbon, supra note 39, at 324.
51. See generally Richmond, supra note 36, at 28-29.
52. See generally id. When viewed in light of the insurers' contractual
obligations, insurer advertisements which seek to induce trust might reasonably be
construed as assurances "that [insurers] will act reliably and reasonably, pay valid
claims that their policies cover, and defend claims or suits as provided in their
policies." Id. at 4 n. 16.

53. Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th 649, 660 (2008).
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expectations." 54 The reasonable expectations doctrine, so defined,
seems to hold promise for those such as Everett. Her attorney argued
that, given State Farm's policy of "extended replacement," its
concomitant imposition of policy limits which ended up being
insufficient to replace Everett's home created an ambiguity in the
contract. 55 Everett's attorney insisted that such ambiguity in the terms
of the policy should be interpreted in favor of Everett when they
"would lead an insured to reasonably expect coverage for the claim
purportedly excluded. 56 The court, however, found that the policy
clearly stated that State Farm's obligation to pay extended only so far
57
as the policy limits.
The reasonable expectations doctrine seeks to protect
unsophisticated consumers from complicated, confusing contract
language, expounded by insurers who possess superior bargaining
power and are thus in a position to extract assent to terms in their
favor. 58 The existence of expectations on the part of consumers, as
well as the reasonableness of those expectations, is inferred from the
"surrounding circumstances." 59 Upon finding a consumer expectation,
the court then evaluates actual coverage provided in the policy in
relation to that expectation. 60 Where the party promulgating a
standardized adhesion contract "has reason to believe that the
adhering party would not have accepted the agreement if he had
known the agreement contained the particular term," that term is not
enforceable against the adhering party. 6' Ascertaining the expectations
54. Thomas, supra note 18, at 298 (quoting Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law
Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REv. 961, 967 (1970)).

Thomas notes that this language endorsing judicial deviation from express
contractual terms constitutes the "strongest form" of the doctrine, with the
"'weakest" being the tendency of courts to use the doctrine "as a rule of construction
to resolve ambiguities." Thomas, supra note 18, at 298-99.
55. See Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 29.
56. Id. at 30 (citation omitted).
57. Everett, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 660.
58. See Thomas, supra note 18, at 296-97.
59. Id. at 299.
60. See HOLMES & RHODES, supra note 17, at 417. The doctrine of reasonable
expectations is invoked primarily in situations where "one party prepares and
proffers a standard form contract to another on a no-bargain take-it-or-leave-it basis
....

.Id.

61.

Id. at 417-18 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237, cmt.
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of consumers via the total surrounding circumstances of the
transaction gives the insured an advantage in that extrinsic evidence of
considered despite the
the nature of the transaction is sometimes
62
evidence.
parol
of
prohibition
general
In a situation such as Everett's, one would be hard pressed to find
a single jurisdiction that would use the doctrine of reasonable
expectations to impute to State Farm either the duty to include limits
which accurately reflect actual replacement costs or refuse to enforce
the limits as contrary to reasonable consumer expectations. Even
where, to ensure fairness to consumers, courts have used the doctrine
to invalidate the implications of contractual language, 63 they have
relied upon the existence of some contractual language or verbal
assurance which effectively put the insurer "on notice" of potential
reasonable expectations of coverage. 64 In the case of inadequate
limits, a court is unlikely to find the existence of such notice absent
the insurer that the policy
explicit oral or written assurances from
65
limits will be sufficient to cover loss.
Absent a specific assurance of adequacy, insurers do not have a
general duty to investigate and inform the insured of adequacy of
coverage. 66
A consumer's reasonable expectations have been
calibrated by courts according to the existence of such express
assurances, and such assurances have been found to supersede written
f (1979)).
62. See David F. Tavella, Are Insurance Policies Still Contracts?, 42

L. REv. 157, 160 (2009). Tavella advocates a "weak" form of the
doctrine of reasonable expectations, arguing that extending the scope of the doctrine
beyond cases where contractual language is ambiguous and uncertain would
undermine "the main goal of contract interpretation [which] generally is to enforce
the parties' intent." Id. at 158 (quoting Burkhardt v. Bailey, 680 N.W.2d 453, 464
(Mich. Ct. App. 2004)).
CREIGHTON

63.

See Pizzullo v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 952 A.2d 1077, 1088-89 (N.J.

2008) (ambiguous language in policy and oral representations by insurers' customer
service representative rendered insureds' expectation of "double coverage"
reasonable).
64.
2002).
65.

See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 189 (3d ed.
See Free v. Republic Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1726, 1730 (1992) (agent's

assurances that policy limits were sufficient, upon regular inquiries by principal,
gave rise to duty to ensure such sufficiency).
66. See Jones v. Grewe, 189 Cal. App. 3d 950, 954 (1987).
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67
terms within the policy.
However, the expectation that an insurer is responsible for
correctly assessing the value of a home, and consequently for
demarcating adequate limits, usually does not arise from express
assurances. Instead, it would seem to arise from the insurer's general
representations and activities in determining limits. The insurer or
agent asks questions of and receives information from the insured for
the purpose of determining limits, using software to assist in the
determination. 68 The consumer, almost always ignorant of reliable
processes for determining replacement value, will as a general manner
rely upon the determinations made by the insurer.
Furthermore, the policy itself, which contains the specific limits
determined by the insurance company, is not presented to the
consumer until she receives it in the mail weeks after the purchase
transaction. 69 The insured thus remains uninvolved as a matter of
contractual process in the determination of specific policy limits. It
may be said, then, that consumers develop expectations that the
insurer has taken up the responsibility of accurately assessing the
replacement costs of the home.
The problem with imputing a reasonable expectation to the
consumer on this basis is that: 1) limits are represented as limits rather
than cost assessments in the policy, and 2) the terms of the policy
unambiguously label the limit figures as estimates rather than accurate
appraisals. 70 Given this unambiguous written language, an insurer
may justifiably argue that any expectation of a duty to reliably assess
replacement costs is unreasonable, absent some independent assurance
(usually in the form of an oral promise) by the insured or agent.
The reasonable expectations doctrine thus resembles the "quasifiduciary" duty of good faith and fair dealing in that each hinges on a
contractual manifestation of agreement that the insurer will undertake

67. See generally Thomas J. Goger, Annotation, Liability of Insurance Agent
or Broker on Ground of Inadequacy of Property Insurance Coverage Procured,72
A.L.R. 3d 747 § lI[a] (1976).
68. Spagat, supra note 10, at G3.
69. R. Ted Cruz & Jeffrey J. Hinck, Not My Brother's Keeper: The Inability
of an Informed Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information, 47 HASTINGs L.J.
635,641 (1996).
70. See Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th 649, 661

(2008).
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the responsibility of accurate assessment. For Everett or Mitchell to
have a contractual cause of action, they would need to point to such a
manifestation.
Insurers benefit from both potential confusion regarding their duty
to assess and from the bounded consumer rationality discussed in Part
I. These factors allow them to limit their own exposure and increase
the exposure of their policyholders. The effects of this advantage can
sometimes result in a disaster after the disaster when a homeowner
suffers a total loss.
III.B. InsurancePolicies as Products:Inadequate Limits and
Defective Warnings
One problem with applying the reasonable expectations doctrine
to insurance policies as contracts is that one major factor justifying
regulation is that insurance consumers do not exhibit the type of
behavior consistent with the development of finely detailed
expectations. 71 It assumes the existence of a bargained-for exchange
that almost never really takes place.72 Optimism bias and other
aspects of bounded rationality result in a vulnerable consumer
populace, and insurers and their agents may manipulate this
vulnerability, especially when the law assumes that the consumer is
bargaining under the traditional paradigm.
The reasonable expectations doctrine has also been criticized as a
vague and unpredictable means of regulation, which leaves insurers
wasting time guessing about consumer expectations that may have no
effect on consumer decisions.73 Daniel Schwarcz, after voicing this
and other criticisms of the reasonable expectations doctrine, has
suggested using a products liability framework for determining
whether insurance policies are "defective" such that the insurer is
71.
72.

See supra Part 1.
See supra Part 1.

73. See generally Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasonable
Expectations After Thirty Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 425, 433

(1998) (arguing that the doctrine converts "every court into a mini-legislature"
engaged in "ad hoc judicial lawmaking"); Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1433-35
(explaining how, under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, "whether the private
benefit to the insurer of disclosing-avoiding future liability-is larger, smaller, or
equal to the social benefit of disclosure-improving consumer information-will vary
on a case-by-case basis").
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legally liable to the consumer for damages.74 One duty that would
arise under such a framework is the insurer's duty to warn
consumers. 75 Such a duty would impose liability upon insurers "when
the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or
warnings."76 This requirement may have promise in inducing insurers
to clarify the risks associated with inadequate insurance limits.
Under the principles of products liability law, a warning that is
overloaded with so much information that it becomes difficult to
process is ineffective.77
An adequate warning would provide
prominent, readable, and comprehensible notifications of the risks
associated with the policy. 78 One of the major risks associated with
the policy is the risk that policy limits will be insufficient. 79 The cost
of promulgating warnings would be limited to the minimal amount of
labor needed to construct them and the relatively limited amount of
money needed to print them along with the rest of the policy. 80 The
benefits to consumers could be significant, drawing their attention to
the risk of inadequate limits. 8 1 A duty to warn in clear, prominent
language would require insurers to state unequivocally a risk that
makes their product look unattractive, a feature of the policy they have
a natural incentive to avoid.82
However, there are significant questions as to whether warnings
would have the desired effect on consumer behavior. The essence of
74. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1436.
75. See id. at 1440.
76. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c)
(1998)).
77. Compare MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 138
(2006) (stating that "too much" information may lead to confusion or paralysis in
consumer choices) with Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and
Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1212 (1994) ("[R]esearch suggests
that consumers in real settings stop assimilating information long before the point of
decision-making paralysis.") and Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1441 ("Multiple
warnings tend to crowd one another out, leaving consumers with a diluted set of
information that most will either ignore or fail to appreciate.").
78. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1441.
79. See id. at 1443-44.
80. See GEISTFELD, supra note 77, at 134.
81. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1444.
82. See GEISTFELD, supra note 77, at 136.
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optimism bias is that consumers tend to underestimate low-probability
events to such a degree that they feel it simply cannot happen to
them. 83 Some commentators suggest that, by highlighting the
negative consequences of underestimated risks, warnings may
increase the likelihood that consumers will take meaningful steps to
avoid such consequences. 84 The form of such emphasis may be
anecdotal. 85 Telling the stories of those such as Everett or Mitchell
who faced significant losses due to underinsurance could raise the
likelihood that insurance consumers will more realistically assess their
level of susceptibility to "total losses."
The effectiveness of such an approach is far from clear. The
type of warning described above simply relates to consumers the
susceptibility of the general population to low-probability events. The
basic function of optimism bias is to arationally differentiate between
one's own risks and those of others. Some studies have shown that,
despite different attempts to "de-bias" consumers' cognitive behavior,
the optimism bias remains an "indefatigable cognitive feature" that
causes "individuals to underestimate the extent to which a threat
applies to them even when they can recognize the severity it poses to
86
others."
Furthermore, warnings that emphasize the high level of loss
experienced by Everett and others could function in a way that simply
reinforces the optimism bias. Descriptions of individuals who are
underinsured by several hundred thousand dollars can serve as an
opportunity for prospective consumers to bolster their unrealistic
comparisons of themselves to others. 87 Consumers may simply focus
upon the risk-increasing factors of the victims portrayed in the
warning (such as the failure to read a policy or understand it, living in
a home highly susceptible to fires or other causes of loss), while
disregarding the risk-decreasing behaviors of such victims and
overestimating the effectiveness of their own risk-decreasing
83. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 20, at 656.
84. Jolls & Sustein, supra note 20, at 210-11.
85. Id. at 212 (suggesting that "requiring the specific account as opposed to the
generalized statement would help to reduce optimism bias" and that "the specific
account of harm ...would change occasionally to avoid the phenomenon of 'wearout' in which consumers learn to tune out messages that are repeated too often").
86. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 20, at 657-58.
87. See id. at 729.
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behaviors. 88 A belief that human skill or behavior can control one's
89
risk level at all may facilitate such unrealistic comparison especially when it comes to natural occurrences such as fire which are
often causally independent of victim behavior.
Finally, the fact that many insurance policies are purchased over
the internet could further frustrate the effectiveness of promulgated
warnings. Most consumers do not actually read the terms of contracts
"formed" via internet transactions. 90 This phenomenon, when taken in
conjunction with the legal presumption in a "failure to warn" case that
the consumer does actually read the warning provided by the
manufacturer, 91 tends to indicate that insurers may be able to rely
upon relatively inexpensive yet ineffective warnings in shielding
themselves from liability.
While prominent warnings targeted to raise awareness of the risks
of underinsurance will certainly increase awareness of the
phenomenon generally, they may not be sufficient to alter the effects
of optimism bias upon consumer behavior. As discussed above, some
warnings may even exacerbate consumer optimism bias. In addition,
the increasing frequency of online insurance purchases, coupled with
consumer tendencies not to read information related to those
purchases, make it even more unlikely that "underinsurance warnings"
will prove effective in de-biasing consumer behavior.
IV.A. EnterpriseLiability and Inadequate InsurancePolicies
There is reason to believe that consumers' "bounded rationality"
88. See id. at 730 (citing research which indicates that "by giving subjects a
'worst-case' list of risk factors or a 'high-risk' comparison target, the researchers
provided them with further 'support' for their biased self-conception.").
89. See id. at 730-31. Insurers themselves might also facilitate such
comparisons by promulgating warnings that exploit this consumer tendency. To do
so, they need only "provide consumers with lists of risk-decreasing factors or a
particularly high-risk consumer as a comparison example so that consumers will
process the information in a self-serving manner and thereby exacerbate the
optimistic bias." Id. at 730.
90. See Heath H. Bruser, Form Contracts in an Online World: The
Enforceability of Click-Wrap or Browse-Wrap Agreements, 55 FED. LAW. 14 (Oct.
2008).
91. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY §
402A cmt. j (1965).
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will be incorrigible and not amenable to even the most carefully
crafted warnings. Part of the appeal of requiring warnings as opposed
to more aggressive bases for insurer liability is that imposing a duty to
92
warn allows people the freedom to make their own choices.
However, where that freedom is merely nominal, and tort law cannot
effect an adjustment in the precautions taken by consumers, some
products liability theorists suggest placing "product-accident costs on
manufacturers." 93 Hanson and Kysar predict that where the consumer
remains "undeterrable,"
imposing "enterprise liability" on
manufacturers works to provide sufficient incentive for such
manufacturers to circulate safer products and pass the cost of this care
on to consumers. 94 The enterprise liability framework provides a
promising alternative that would eliminate the qualitatively severe
losses of those such as Everett and Mitchell while allowing insurers to
compensate for increased costs through product pricing.
Enterprise liability imposes liability on a manufacturer for any
harm caused by its product. 95 An application of this general principle
of liability to the context of limits in insurance policies would simply
92. Jolls & Sustein, supra note 20, at 202. In addition to this "choicepreserving" function, Jolls and Sustein claim that methods of "de-biasing," such as
consumer warnings, have the added benefit of helping "to address boundedly
rational behavior while avoiding the imposition of significant costs on those who do
not exhibit bounded rationality." Id. The pivotal assumption of this contention is that
"de-biasing" methods will in fact influence consumer behavior in a way that avoids
significant social costs.
93. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A
Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 259, 269 (2000)
[hereinafter Hanson & Kysar, A Response].
94. Id. at 269-70. In the field of products liability, a major argument against
the imposition of enterprise liability is that "consumers would have no incentive to
undertake their own precautions if manufacturers were forced to bear all of the cost
of the harm that products cause." Id. at 272 (quoting James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Product-RelatedRisk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings
of Enterprise Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 226 (2000)). With
respect to homeowners' incentive to assess the adequacy of their policy limits, the
stories of those such as Everett and Mitchell, as well as the prevalence of
underinsurance, suggest that policyholders remain boundedly rational despite
powerful extant incentives to behave otherwise. Indeed, the operation of "bounded
rationality" upon decision-making evinces a discontinuity between action and
"rational interests." See supra Part I.
95. Id. at 263.
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require insurers to absorb the cost of "total losses," in effect
abolishing the function performed by replacement coverage limits in
homeowners insurance policies.
Ironically, and somewhat instructively, one major argument
against the doctrine of enterprise liability in tort law has been that
accident victims can "avoid a concentrated loss by insuring." 96 Where
insurance fails to perform this function, and this failure causes the loss
in question, the fact that consumers are far less able to "cover" for the
loss than are insurers provides a compelling reason for placing the
burden on those insurers. 97 In fact, the very purpose of insurance is
the transfer of risk. 98 Imposing enterprise liability would facilitate this
function, as consumer behavior results in a failure to identify and
99
subsequently discriminate between policies that insure adequately.
Inevitably, the imposition of enterprise liability would lead to
insurer externalization of the cost of compensation. 10 0 This would
presumably result in higher premiums.
However, given the
concurrent incentive for insurers to attract a large number of
consumers in order to effectively pool these premiums for the purpose
of subsequent investment, they would be forced to keep prices
competitive. 10 1 The costs that would result from imposing enterprise
liability on inadequate insurance limits would be distributed by
96. VIRGINIA E. NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE
LIABILITY: RETHINKING TORT REFORM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 145 (1995)
(quoting Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 210

n. 15 (1973)).
97. See Hanson & Kysar, A Response, supra note 93, at 274.
98. See JERRY, supra note 64, at 15.
99. See Hanson & Kysar, A Response, supra note 93, at 269.
100. Id.
101. Notwithstanding consumers' tendency to overlook contractual terms, it is
"surely a highly realistic assumption" that "the price of a product is a salient product
attribute for buyers." Korobkin, supra note 22 at 1234. Consumer surveys support
the conclusion that, for most buyers, contractual allocation of the "duty to diagnose"
the adequacy of limits is not a salient attribute of insurance policies. See J.D. Power,
supra note 16 and accompanying text. Where insurers may use contractual terms or
warnings to avoid the costs of total losses, the natural incentive is to lower premium
prices (achieving larger pools of premiums) and increase cost-avoiding terms.
However, where insurers bear the costs of total losses, the salience of policy prices
to buyers provides an incentive to keep prices low without providing an incentive to
manipulate buyers into positions of high exposure.
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insurers to its policyholders.
Even a relatively significant rise in premiums would be justified
to avoid the sort of problems experienced by those such as Everett and
Mitchell. It is sensible to distinguish the cost of higher periodic
premiums, even when aggregated over a large population of
policyholders, from the cost of coping with severe underinsurance,
even where the latter is experienced by a relatively small portion of
insureds. The two types of losses are qualitatively distinct. While
higher premiums are certainly not desirable (even when tempered by
the incentive to keep premiums low and the pool of consumers large),
the devastation that is visited upon those such as Mitchell who are
unable through any means to "cover" their loss is particularly
devastating. 10 2 The financial and emotional toll exacted by such
experiences warrants prioritizing the prevention of such losses, even if
this results in an aggregate increase in premiums that is higher than
the aggregate increase in claim payments during a given year or set of
years. To claim otherwise would be to fall into what some label the
"impersonal total principle." 10 3 It would be to conclude that a set of
individuals each experiencing one mild inconvenience could somehow
become large enough to be "worse off' than a single individual
suffering from a devastating loss.
Enterprise liability with respect to policy limits would, in a
simple manner, eliminate the qualitatively severe experiences suffered
by homeowners who find themselves drastically underinsured after a
total loss. The natural result of such a liability policy would be to
render limits useless as a means of limiting insurer payment on claims
At the same time, insurers could
resulting from total losses.
compensate for higher payouts by distributing these added costs
among policyholders. While this may result in higher premiums, it
would also alleviate the type of losses caused by underinsurance.
IV.B. Regulatory Eliminationof Total Loss Limits in Homeowners
Insurance Policies
As noted above, the natural effect of imposing enterprise liability
102. See generally Marc Lifsher, Wildfires Heat Up Debate on Rising
Rebuilding Costs: Are Policies Adequate to Help Make Homeowners Whole?, L.A.
TIMES, June 6, 2008, at 1.
103. DEREK PARFiT, REASONS AND PERSONS, 386-87 (1984).
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upon insurance policy limits is to strip those limits of the function of
reducing insurer risk. 10 4 However, the exposure of insurers to
10 5
increased risk can be "covered" via adjustment of premiums.
Prohibiting the use of limits by insurers to pay less than the
replacement cost of a home, even though the insurance policy
otherwise warrants such a replacement, prevents the qualitatively
10 6
severe losses experienced by those such as Everett and Mitchell.
As it would be senseless to allow limits only to prohibit their use in
the case of losses which exceed them, the simplest mechanism to
achieve the function of enterprise liability as stated above is to
statutorily prohibit insurance policies from setting limits.
The effect of such a prohibition would be to require that any
homeowner's insurance policy be a "guaranteed replacement" policy.
It would make a conceptual distinction between limits and the rest of
the insurance policy (viewed either as a product or a contract), and
ban the former as a product too likely to cause severe harm to
consumers. Jolls and Sustein acknowledge that "[b]oundedly rational
behavior.., often is... taken to justify a strategy of insulation,
attempting to protect legal outcomes from people's bounded
rationality."' 0 7 While they advocate a more careful consideration of
"de-biasing" consumers via various legal requirements such as the
"policy warnings" described above, 10 8 there is good behavioral
evidence suggesting that such strategies would be largely futile in the
09
context of correcting "optimism bias."'
The insulation strategy of barring limits would not affect the law's
treatment of other aspects of the insurance policy itself, such as
ambiguous provisions. Schwarcz's strategy of treating insurance
policies as "products" is one example of a framework designed
specifically to address the legal implications of defective, or
inefficiently drafted and ambiguous policy provisions."l0 Policy limits
are distinct from policy provisions relating to coverage and exclusion
104.
105.
106.
107.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
Jols & Sustein, supra note 20, at 200.

108. Id. at 202.
109. See supra Part III.B.
110. See Schwarcz, supra note 31, at 1447-48.
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in that the process of instituting limits relates not only to determining
the obligations of the insurer, but also to determining the needs of the
insured. Given the consumer behavior described in Part I, insurance
purchasers are especially susceptible to assessment practices which
(intentional or not) shift risk exposure from the insurer to the insured
via inaccurate "estimates" of consumer need (i.e., reconstruction
costs).
Prohibiting the institution of insurance limits would insulate
consumers from the effects of confusion regarding whose duty it is to
assess the needs of the insured. In addition, it would provide insurers
more of an incentive to accurately predict the cost of replacement for a
given dwelling, so that premiums could be accurately calibrated in
relation to the potential cost or level of risk imported by an individual
consumer.
It is worth mentioning an alternative regulatory measure, and why
it would prove inferior to an outright ban on policy limits. Regulation
could be enacted which, while not prohibiting policy limits, prohibits
insurers from calculating those limits. This would sever any insurer
motivation to shift risk exposure from the limits assessment process,
and require the purchaser to go through the process of calculating
replacement costs. Presumably, the demand for services in the area of
replacement cost assessment would give rise to service providers
bearing the sole interest and obligation of accurately assessing costs.
The more demanding process of engaging in a detailed calculation of
replacement cost could also counter the low level of consumer
involvement mentioned in Part I.
However, the major difference between prohibiting insurer
calculationof limits and prohibiting policy limits per se is that, under
the former prohibition, policyholders would individually bear the
potentially severe cost of inaccurate assessments. This would lead, in
some cases, to the type of qualitatively distinct harms suffered by
Everett and Mitchell. Under an outright ban of policy limits, the costs
related to total losses are distributed amongst premium payments.
Individuals will pay higher premiums based upon insurer individual
replacement cost projections (which do not serve as limits). In
addition, premiums may be raised across the board to account for
insurer solvency in the case of a catastrophe requiring a high number
of claim payments. The primary advantage to an outright ban on
policy limits is that the type of severe losses illustrated by Everett's
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case would be eliminated. As argued in Part IV.A above, the
elimination of such devastating losses warrants prioritization.
V. CONCLUSION

Homeowners insurance policyholders are ill-equipped to
" ' The
determine the appropriate limits for their insurance policies.11
current legal framework defining insurers' obligations to their
insureds does not effectively account for this reality, in turn providing
an incentive for insurers to sustain ambiguity and confusion regarding
a duty to accurately assess replacement costs. 112 While some suggest
that legally required warnings regarding the dangers of underinsurance
may correct consumer behavior, the nature of the cognitive biases
which largely give rise to consumer vulnerability suggest that such
warnings may be ineffective.1 13 However, the reasons typically
justifying an enterprise liability model of products liability provide a
compelling case for banning policy limits altogether. 1 4 Such a ban
would be superior to alternative regulatory measures, in that it would
work to prevent insurance policy failures that exasperate what is
1 15
already a devastating experience for homeowners.
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